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THE "ORDER-OF-BATTLE"

IN

CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
Michael L. Wells*

HIS Article examines and defends a procedural rule that figures
prominently in constitutional tort litigation,1 has drawn sharp criticism from the federal judiciary, and seems to have lost the support
of at least four sitting Supreme Court Justices. In order to recover damages, plaintiffs must not only prove a constitutional violation but also
fend off assertions of official immunity. In ruling on motions to dismiss
the complaint and motions for summary judgment, a preliminary question is the sequence in which the two issues should be addressed-a problem the Justices call the "order-of-battle."' 2 Morse v. Frederick, the
"Bong Hits 4 Jesus" case, illustrates the issue.3 Frederick, a high school
student, displayed a banner containing that phrase at an off-campus event
and was suspended by Morse, the school's principal, when he refused to
take it down. 4 He sued Morse under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the
punishment on free speech grounds. The substantive constitutional issue
was whether the First Amendment protected the banner in these circumstances. 5 The immunity issue was whether Morse should escape liability
for damages even if the suspension infringed Frederick's First Amendment right, on the ground that the right she violated was not "clearly
established" at the time. 6 Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion reached
the merits and found no free speech violation. 7 Justice Breyer would
have decided the case differently. The Court "need not and should not
decide this difficult First Amendment issue on the merits."'8 Rather, "it
should simply hold that qualified immunity bars the student's claim for
* Professor, University of Georgia Law School. The author wishes to thank Bobby
Bartlett, Tom Eaton, Sheldon Nahmod, and Jason Solomon for helpful comments on a
draft of this Article.
1. These are suits brought against state officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and against
federal officers under the principle of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971). For general overviews of the area, see
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION (2d
ed. 2007); SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS (2d ed. 2004).
2. Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 n.4 (2007); see also id. at 1780 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
3. 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2638 (2007).
4. Id. at 2622.
5. Id. at 2624.
6. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (explaining that officials are
immune from liability for damages unless they violate "clearly established" federal law).
7. Morse, 127 S.Ct. at 2629.
8. Id. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

1539

1540

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

monetary damages and say no more." 9
Justice Breyer's quarrel with the Morse majority concerns a directive
the Court had issued to the lower courts several years ago in Saucier v.
Katz. 10 There the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had put the immunity

issue first." The Supreme Court, after many years of counseling lower
courts that "the better approach" was to decide the substantive issue
before immunity,1 2 laid down a rule to that effect. 13 Writing for the
Court, Justice Kennedy declared that "the first inquiry must be whether a
constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged."' 14 By
beginning with the immunity issue, the Court of Appeals did not merely
5
make an unwise choice. It "was in error."'
Criticism of the rule soon emerged. Notably, in Brosseau v. Haugen,
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, expressed concern
that Saucier "rigidly requires lower courts unnecessarily to decide difficult constitutional questions when there is available an easier basis for the
decision (e.g., qualified immunity).' 6 Echoing these sentiments, lower
9. Id.
10. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
11. See Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999). Besides the two alternatives of (1) resolving the constitutional issue first, and (2) putting the immunity first, a
third approach, followed by some pre-Sauciercourts, was (3) to collapse the two questions
into a single inquiry. See, e.g., Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 416-19 (8th Cir. 2000)
(upholding the defendant's qualified immunity defense, apparently on the ground that he
committed no constitutional violation). This method of addressing the issues has no defenders on the Supreme Court.
12. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). For an earlier
and somewhat less direct expression of the Court's preference for putting the constitutional issue first, see Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991). Siegert and Lewis are
discussed in John M. M. Graebe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for "Unnecessary" Constitutional Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 411-18
(1999) (arguing, pre-Saucier, that the aims of constitutional tort would be better served by
deciding the constitutional issue first.). See infra text accompanying notes 133, 150.
13. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200 (directing that "the first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged"). Earlier, somewhat less definitive, expressions of this directive can be found in Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609
(1999), and Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999).
14. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200.
15. Id.
16. 543 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer also brought
up the burden imposed on the federal courts by the requirement that they resolve the
constitutional issue. See id. This "scarce judicial resources" argument is an old refrain in
constitutional tort law, dating back at least thirty-six years. Justice Black, dissenting from
the Court's recognition in the Bivens case of an implied cause of action to enforce the
Fourth Amendment, complained that allowing victims to sue would strain federal judicial
resources. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 427-29 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). As recently as the final week of the October
2006 Term, the Court resorted to a similar argument in declining to extend Bivens to allow
a suit seeking damages for retaliating against the plaintiff's exercise of his property rights.
See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2604 (2007) (recognizing that the cause of action
would generate an "enormous swath of potential litigation"). The best answer to Justices
Black, Breyer, and Souter is the one offered by Justice Harlan, concurring in Bivens, and
echoed by Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in Wilkie. Justice Harlan pointed out that such
factors of judicial resources "should not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition
of otherwise sound constitutional principles." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411 (Harlan, J., concur-
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court judges have questioned the wisdom of Saucier,17 distinguished it,18
and ignored it.19 More recently, in Scott v. Harris,20 twenty-eight states
joined in an amicus brief (the "States' Brief") calling for overruling Saucier.21 Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion in that case, endorsing
the States' Brief and declaring that he would leave "lower courts ... free
to decide the two questions in whatever order makes sense in the context
of a particular case."'22 A few weeks later, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
said that they, too, would "disavow" Saucier.23 At one time or another, a
total of five Justices-one of whom, Chief Justice Rehnquist, is no longer
with us-have called for reconsidering the rule.2 4 For its part, the Scott
majority sidestepped the issue, noting the debate over the continuing viaring in the judgment); see also Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2613 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
17. See, e.g., Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 580-84 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J.,
concurring). Another circuit judge chose a law review article as the vehicle for his criticism. See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution:Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1249, 1275-81 (2006).
18. See, e.g., Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1078 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005); Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381 F.3d 235, 241 (3rd Cir. 2004); Tremblay v. McClellan, 350 F.3d
195, 199-200 (1st Cir. 2003).
19. See, e.g., Cherrington v. Skeeter, 344 F.3d 631, 640 (6th Cir. 2003); Koch v. Town of
Brattleboro, 287 F.3d 162, 166 (2nd Cir. 2002).
20. 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
21. See Brief for the States of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 05-1631), 2006 WL 3747719 [hereinafter States'
Brie].
22. Scott, 127 S.Ct. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Morse v.Frederick, 127 S.
Ct. 2618, 2638-41 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (reiterating this view). One critic of Saucier pushes the constitutional avoidance argument a step further, arguing that Saucier violates Article III's prohibition on advisory
opinions and that a federal court should never decide the constitutional issue first in a
qualified immunity case. See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary ConstitutionalRulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 856-57, 895-921 (2005). No Supreme Court Justice, past or
present, seems to share Professor Healy's view. Nor do any of the federal judges who
criticize Saucier, with the possible exception of Judge Leval. See Leval, supra note 17, at
1280-81 (recommending only a narrow exception to a general rule of deciding the immunity issue first). John Graebe rebuts the "central premise of the strict necessity position:
that legal holdings are properly regarded as encompassing only those legal pronouncements which, when viewed post hoc, are strictly necessary to resolution of the case at
hand." Graebe, supra note 12, at 420-21.
The threshold problem with Professor Healy's reasoning-and no doubt the reason for
his isolation on this issue-is that the advisory opinion doctrine ordinarily functions more as
a standard than as a rule. It is, as he recognizes elsewhere in his article, "usually implemented through other justiciability doctrines, such as standing, ripeness, and mootness."
Healy, supra, at 896. Each of these doctrines incorporates the "advisory opinions" theme
into a larger matrix of factors bearing on whether a given litigant or a given dispute should
be granted access to federal court. See infra note 84. Only a naked request for advice, as
in the early episode of the Correspondence of the Justices (1793), reprinted in RICHARD
FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
78-79 (5th ed. 2003) would trigger what he calls the "ban on advisory opinions," Healy,
supra, at 895.
23. Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 1994 (2007) (per curiam) (Stevens,
J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). See also Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S.
Ct. 2588, 2617 n.10 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24. See Scott, 127 S.Ct. at 1774 n.4 (recounting the Justices' expressions of "doubt...
regarding the wisdom of Saucier's decision to make the threshold inquiry mandatory").
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bility of Saucier, but resolving the issue in the case at hand without taking
sides. 25 Since the order-of-battle rule has no bearing on primary conduct
and induces no reliance on the part of anyone in the way people conduct
their affairs, the Court is unlikely to adhere to Saucierjust for the sake of
respecting precedent. 26 Precedents have little weight when they address
jurisdictional matters and similar issues unrelated to primary conduct,
thereby 27producing little or no reliance and little or no interest in
stability.
Why has an apparently routine policy, bearing on the internal dynamics
of adjudication, spawned so much controversy? The answer is that appearances are deceptive. In reality, the order-of-battle rule has significant consequences for the role of the federal courts in adjudicating
constitutional cases. Underneath the surface of this seemingly mundane
issue simmers a clash between competing constitutional principles. On
the one hand, absent the Saucier rule, lower courts may routinely incline
to dispose of section 1983 cases without reaching the merits, to the detriment of the development of substantive constitutional law. 28 On the
other, the argument against Saucier relies on the Court's longstanding
policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions. 29 If the defendant
wins on the official immunity issue, the argument goes, the plaintiff gets
no damages whether or not the defendant committed a constitutional vio25. See id. (deciding that the Court "need not address the wisdom of Saucier in this
case"). The substantive issue in Scott was whether a police officer could be held liable for a
Fourth Amendment violation when he engaged in a high-speed chase that ended with injury to the person being pursued. Id. at 1772. The Court held that "[a] police officer's
attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent
bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death." Id. at 1779.
In Morse v. Frederick, too, the Court dodged the question of the continuing vitality of
Saucier. There the plaintiff sought not only damages, but also prospective relief. Hence,
the Court explained, the constitutional issue would have to be addressed in any event, as
the defendant would enjoy no immunity from prospective relief. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.
Ct. 2618, 2624 n.1 (2007). Justice Breyer took issue with that reasoning. Compare id. with
id. at 2642-43 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The
dispute between the majority and Justice Breyer on that point need not be resolved here.
26. See Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1781 (Breyer, J., concurring).
27. See Michael Wells, The Unimportance of Precedent in the Law of Federal Courts,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 376-83 (1990).
28. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 207 (2001) (This sequence promotes "the
law's elaboration from case to case," and "permits courts in appropriate cases to elaborate
the constitutional right with greater ... specificity"). Underlying the perceived need to
develop the law is the general proposition that "constitutional adjudication ... functions
more as a vehicle for the pronouncement of norms than for the resolution of particular
disputes." Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1800 (1991). But one can usefully examine the narrow order-of-battle issue without necessarily taking a general stand on the
broad question of the extent to which the federal courts ought to devote more of their
resources to pronouncing norms rather than resolving disputes, or so it seems to the
author.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 127 S. Ct. 782, 785 (2007) ("[i]t is not
the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to the decision of the case." (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring))).

20071

Order-of-Battle

1543

lation. It follows that the case can often be resolved without reaching the
constitutional question and with a lesser investment of judicial resources.
This Article examines the constitutional avoidance objection to Saucier
and finds it wanting. Saucier's critics invoke constitutional avoidance as
a kind of mantra that suffices to advance their cause without regard to the
context in which the occasion for avoidance arises. 30 But constitutional
avoidance is a more complex and nuanced policy than they suppose it to
be. The Court has never treated avoidance as an absolute; it is a policy
aimed at specific objectives, and these nearly always compete with other
goals. The strength of the avoidance argument vis-a-vis other policies
varies depending on context, and it is especially weak in constitutional
tort law. The order-of-battle issue presents the avoidance theme in a
distinctive setting, and resolving it requires careful attention to the interaction between constitutional avoidance and constitutional torts. The
aims of constitutional tort law include vindicating constitutional rights
and deterring constitutional violations. Allowing lower courts discretion
to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to apply the avoidance policyas Justice Breyer proposes-would systematically undermine those goals.
This is too high a price to pay for the minimal benefits of avoidance in
this context.
Part I of this Article describes the "order-of-battle" problem in constitutional torts and Part II discusses the general policy of constitutional
avoidance. Part III makes the case that, on balance, the costs of constitutional avoidance outweigh its benefits in the constitutional tort context.
I.

THE "ORDER-OF-BATFLE" PROBLEM AND THE LAW OF
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

Two distinctions will help to situate the order-of-battle issue within the
law of constitutional remedies and lay a foundation for the argument that
follows. The first is between offensive and defensive remedies. The latter
can be illustrated by a criminal defendant accused of distributing obscene
material who argues that the items are protected by the First Amendment, or that they were seized by an unreasonable search in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. These defendants use the constitution as a
30. Critics of Saucier typically appeal to the constitutional avoidance policy without
examining its underpinnings or the limits of its reach. See, e.g., Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2640
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("we should . . .
adhere to a basic constitutional obligation by avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional questions"); Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring) (declaring that "frequently the order-of-battle rule violates that older, wiser judicial counsel not to pass on
questions of constitutionality unless such adjudication is unavoidable") (internal ellipses
and citation omitted); States' Brief, supra note 21, at *11 ("On its own, this longstanding
principle of judicial restraint counsels in favor of permitting courts the flexibility to resolve
qualified immunity cases without first reaching the merits of the constitutional question.");
Healy, supra note 22, at 850 ("For the most part, the Court has adhered to the principle
that, whenever possible, the resolution of constitutional questions should be put off for
another day."); Leval, supra note 17, at 1277 ("It is a long-honored principle that a court
should decide a constitutional question only when there is no other basis for resolving the
dispute.").
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shield. Our concern here is with offensive remedies. Section 1983 and
Bivens authorize persons with constitutional claims to take the role of
plaintiff, deploy the Constitution as a sword, and bring suit against officers or local governments.
The second distinction relates to the relief available in these suits. Offensive litigation of this kind may seek either prospective relief, in the
form of an injunction or a declaratory judgment aimed at changing official behavior in the future, or retrospective relief by way of a constitutional tort suit seeking damages for harm done in the past. 3a This Article
deals with a problem that comes up in the latter type of litigation, socalled constitutional tort suits, where someone sues a government official
solely for damages for a constitutional violation under section 1983 or
Bivens. Besides establishing a constitutional violation, the plaintiff in
such a case faces another hurdle. Officers who violate rights while acting
in a judicial, prosecutorial, or legislative function enjoy "absolute" immunity,32 and simply may not be sued for damages, no matter how egregious
their conduct. 33 Other officers are entitled to "qualified" immunity,
which protects them "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established. . . constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known."' 34 Since a successful invocation
of immunity produces victory for the officer, it may be possible to avoid
the constitutional issue entirely by addressing the immunity issue first.
No one denies that analytical clarity would generally be served by deciding whether the plaintiff states a violation of a constitutional right
before deciding if the right was clearly established at the time. Saucier's
harshest critics acknowledge that "it often may be difficult to decide
whether a right is clearly established without deciding precisely what the
exiting constitutional right happens to be."' 35 Justice Breyer does not call
for replacing Saucier with a rule requiring that the immunity issue be decided first, but prefers a flexible, case-by-case approach. 36 In some cir31. Prospective relief has been available at least since Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
159-60 (1908). See FALLON ET AL., supra note 22, at 992-95. The modern cases affirming

the availability of damages are Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961) (against state
officers, in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (against federal officers, in
a cause of action implied directly from the Constitution). The classic articles on these suits
for damages, written in the wake of the key Supreme Court decisions, include Walter E.
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532
(1972) and Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 277 (1965).

32. See, e.g., Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 53 (1998) (legislative immunity);
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978) (judicial immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity).
33. Of course, they have no absolute immunity for other functions. See, e.g., Forrester
v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223-24 (1988) (finding that hiring and firing decisions by a judge
are not part of his judicial functions, so they are not protected by absolute judicial
immunity).
34. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
35. States' Brief, supra note 21, at *18 (quoting Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565,
581 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring)).
36. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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cumstances, an orderly and coherent resolution of the case seems to
demand that the constitutional issue come first. Saucier itself is an example. The plaintiff there charged that a police officer had violated his
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure by using excessive
force in arresting him when shoving him into the back of a police van.
The outcome depended on whether, in the circumstances, the amount of
force employed by the officer was reasonable. The immunity issue was
whether-given a constitutional violation-the officer had made a reasonable mistake as to the reasonableness of the amount of force he was permitted to use. 37 It seems awkward to try to decide the immunity issue-in
other words, whether an officer has made a reasonable mistake as to what
was a reasonable amount of force-without first deciding whether the
38
amount of force he used was reasonable.
In other cases, however, there are stronger arguments for deciding the
immunity issue first. In particular, on a given set of facts, the immunity
issue may be far easier to resolve than the substantive one. These are
cases in which the substantive issue is novel or sharply controverted, so
that however it comes out the officer will win on immunity. Brosseau v.
Haugen,3 9 like Saucier, also concerned the use of excessive force in making an arrest. 40 But there the circumstances made it easier to resolve the
immunity issue than the substantive one. In order to make that point,
consider the facts giving rise to the litigation. Haugen got into a fight
with someone, and Brosseau, a police officer, responded to a call for
help. 4 1 Brosseau also knew that there was a warrant out for Haugen's
arrest on drug charges. 42 She and other officers chased Brosseau on foot
for over half an hour.4 3 Then Haugen managed to get into his Jeep Cherokee, which was parked a few feet from vehicles containing other participants in the fight. 4 4 Brosseau tried to stop him, breaking the window
glass and striking him with her gun. 4 5 When Haugen nonetheless started
the Jeep, Brosseau jumped back and fired one shot, hitting Haugen in the
back. 46 Haugen later pleaded guilty to the felony of "eluding," a plea
that in effect admitted that he drove the Jeep with wanton or wilful disre37. The Ninth Circuit had held that since both the substantive and the immunity issues
turned on "reasonableness," the immunity issue collapsed into the substantive issue. Katz
v. United States, 194 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 1999). Under this approach, the officer would
be liable once it was determined that he acted unreasonably. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 199-200 (2001). The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning, holding that the officer
would win if either (1) he employed a reasonable amount of force or (2) he made a reasonable mistake as to what would constitute a reasonable amount of force. See id. at 206.
38. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ignored its own directive and did just that. See id.
at 207-08.
39. 543 U.S. 194 (2004).

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 194-97.
at 195.
at 196.
at 196-97.
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gard for others' lives. 47
48
Haugen then sued Brosseau for excessive force in making the arrest.
49
The closest precedent was Tennessee v. Garner, which held that it is
unreasonable to "seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect by shooting
him dead."' 50 Though Brosseau did not kill Haugen, federal courts have
held that shooting someone is considered deadly force. 51 The substantive
issue was whether Brosseau used reasonable force on these facts. The
Ninth Circuit devoted eleven pages to this issue and concluded, over a
nine-page dissent, 52 that the plaintiff should win at the summary judgment stage, because the facts thus far developed would support a finding
that the force was excessive. 53 The majority and the dissent considered
such factors as whether Haugen's prior crimes would justify the officer in
taking strong measures, whether the evidence necessarily supported the
officer's inference that once inside the vehicle he may have been reaching
for a weapon, and whether a jury would necessarily be obliged to conclude that Haugen's effort to escape in the vehicle would endanger
others.54 The Ninth Circuit also denied qualified immunity at the sum55
mary judgment stage.
Ignoring the rule it set forth for lower courts in Saucier, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari solely on the qualified immunity issue and reversed. 56 It held that whatever the proper outcome may be on the excessive force issue, the few earlier cases similar to the Brosseau fact pattern
were at best equivocal, showing "that this area is one in which the result
depends very much on the facts of each case." '57 Brosseau is a posterchild for overruling Saucier in favor of flexibility. The lower federal
courts often encounter cases like Brosseau, where the facts are complex
so that the immunity issue is easier to resolve than the substantive one
and comes out in the officer's favor, allowing them to dispose of the case
without deciding a difficult constitutional issue.58 Brosseau makes it easy
to see why Judge Leval would characterize Saucier as a "bizarre
practice. 59

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 197.

Id.
471 U.S. 1 (1985).
Id. at 11.
See, e.g., Rahn v. Hawkins, 464 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 2006).

52. See Haugen v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 876-85 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J.,

dissenting).
53. Id. at 873.
54.

Compare id. at 869-73, with id. at 877-78 (Gould, J., dissenting).

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 873.
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 n.3 (2004).
Id. at 201.
See, e.g., Rosales v. City of Bakersfield, No. CV-F-05-2370ww/LJO, 2007 WL

1847628 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2007).

59. Leval, supra note 17, at 1280.
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CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE

Critics of Saucier rely heavily on the policy of constitutional avoidance
as the central argument against putting the constitutional issue first. Insofar as one can tell from the way they deploy the avoidance doctrine,
they seem to think it is an undifferentiated value across the whole range
of constitutional adjudication, for they pay no attention to the distinctive
features of the order-of-battle problem. 60 In conceiving of avoidance as
monolithic, they are mistaken. Rather, the Supreme Court's decisions
show that the strength of the constitutional avoidance policy varies from
one situation to another and that its application depends on its costs and
61
benefits in a given context.
A.

Two

VERSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE

Discussions of constitutional avoidance typically begin with Justice
Brandeis's classic exposition of the policy in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.62

Brandeis identified two broad propositions. 63 First,

when a litigant raises a constitutional objection to a statute, "this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible
by which the question may be avoided. '64 Second, Brandeis observed
that the Court "will not pass upon a constitutional question ... if there is

also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed
66
of."'6 5 Today this latter proposition is often called the "last resort rule,"
a usage this Article will follow. Of the two types of constitutional avoidance, only the last resort rule bears on the order-of-battle. Saucier's crit60. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
61. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003,
1028-35 (1994) (showing that "[t]he Court has used an ad hoc approach in implementing
the last resort rule"). For a recent illustration, see In re Fashina,486 F.3d 1300, 1303 (D.C.
Cir. 2007). Even Professor Healy, an ardent advocate of constitutional avoidance, acknowledges (as a prelude to criticizing the practice) that unnecessary constitutional decision
making is on the rise. See Healy, supra note 22, at 850, 858-95.
62. 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The Court endorsed Justice
Brandeis's account of the avoidance policy in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S.
549, 568-69 (1947), and continues to do so. See supra note 29.
63. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring): see FALLON ET AL.,

supra note 22, at 87-88 (distinguishing the "last resort rule" from what the authors call the
"avoidance canon").
64. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
65. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
66. This is the label given by Dean Kloppenberg. See Kloppenberg, supra note 61, at
1004. Justice Brandeis listed five other avoidance principles. Four of these are closely
related to the last resort rule, if not mere corollaries of it. Thus, "[t]he Court will not pass
upon the validity of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding," "will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it," "will not
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which
it is to be applied," and "will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation." Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-47
(Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
The final principle deals only peripherally with avoidance: The Court will not hear a
constitutional challenge to a statute by someone who has "availed himself of its benefits."
Id. at 348 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
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ics maintain that official immunity is just the kind of alternative ground
that the last resort rule directs courts to adopt in lieu of a constitutional
67
ruling.
Separating these "avoidance" strands helps to clarify the relation between the avoidance policy and the order-of-battle issue. Much of the
contemporary debate on avoidance centers on the "statutory construction" theme. Critics claim that this maxim often entails an equally "aggressive judicial performance" as invalidation. 68 Construing statutes to
avoid constitutional problems may entail smuggling constitutional interpretation into the process of construing the statute, thereby shifting for69
mal focus on the analysis, but not truly avoiding the constitutional issue.
One critic argues that the practice shows "illusory respect for legislative
supremacy," and "does not avoid the unnecessary making of constitutional law."' 70 In addition, it "commonly creates a here-and-now conflict
between Court and Executive."' 71 This critique may land telling blows
against the "statutory construction" prong of the avoidance doctrine, but
it does not directly threaten the last resort rule. Relying on a non-constitutional ground under the last resort rule effectively avoids the constitutional issue. In opposing its application to the order-of-battle problem,
the author does not rely on the objections to the "statutory construction"
72
maxim.

B.

THE LAST RESORT RULE

Constitutional avoidance aims to minimize the friction between democratic principles and judicial authority. A premise of our system of government is that conflicts among social goals ordinarily should be resolved
by majority rule. At the same time, the legislative and executive
branches are not free to do as they please. At least since Marbury v.
Madison, courts have asserted the power to thwart the will of the majority through judicial review of the acts of elected officials. 73 The power is
said to be justified by the need to protect the rights of minorities,74 the
67. See supra note 29.
68. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 71, 97.
69. See id. at 73 ("[Tlhe increasingly common practice of interpreting statutes so as to
avoid constitutional questions involves paying a price for the benefits thought to come
from judicial reticence in the exercise of its constitutional authority."); see also William K.
Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 831, 834 (2001) (arguing "that the [avoidance] canon seriously intrudes upon the
roles of both Congress and the Executive in the constitutional scheme").
70. Kelley, supra note 69, at 860.
71. Id. at 867-68.
72. The author does, however, argue that resolving qualified immunity claims often
requires attention to substantive constitutional issues. See infra Section IIt.A.1.
73. 137, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). General recognition of the power of judicial
review may have antedated Marbury. See Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the
"Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1113-26 (2001); William Michael
Treanor, JudicialReview Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457 (2005).
74. For an influential exposition of this rationale for intensive judicial oversight of the
other branches, see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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constitutional system of checks and balances, 75 and the premise that 76a
written constitution implies limits on legislative and executive authority.
Since we value both democratic principles and judicial oversight too
77
much to part with either, the dilemma is a topic of enduring debate.
The tension between the two principles-a conflict Alexander Bickel
called the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" 7 8-has generated a vast body
of case law and scholarly commentary on the legitimacy of judicial review, its scope, and the extent to which it actually interferes with demo79
cratic decision making.
The problem is not just academic or theoretical. If courts interfere too
much with the work of the executive and the legislature, democratic values will suffer. In the 1930s, for example, a narrow conservative majority
on the Supreme Court blocked efforts by Congress and the President to
battle the Great Depression.8° This is not the only danger. The
majoritarian branches may retaliate by looking for ways to curb judicial
authority, as President Roosevelt did after the 1936 election. 81 Faced
with the Court's intransigence, he proposed to add several Justices, the
The leading academic work elaborating on the Carolene Products theory of judicial review
is JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
75. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 229 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed.,
1961) (advocating that rather than supposing that "the legislative body are themselves the
is far more rational to suppose that the
constitutional judges of their own powers .... [i]t
courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in
order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority").
76. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175-76; see also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16 (15th ed. 2004).
77. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 76, at 19.
78. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1982).

79. For a comprehensive treatment, see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic
Obsession: The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153
(2002) [hereinafter Friedman, Academic Obsession], as well as earlier articles in the series.
Barry Friedman, The Counter-majoritarianProblem and the Pathology of Constitutional
Scholarship,95 Nw. U. L. REV. 933 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Two: Reconstruction'sPoliticalCourt, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); Barry
Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of
Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000). A central
theme of Professor Friedman's oeuvre is that judicial review is actually not particularly
countermajoritarian. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2599 (2003) ("The animating idea of the Article is that our system is
one of popular constitutionalism, in that judicial interpretations of the Constitution reflect
popular will over time."). To the extent he is right, the case for avoidance is weaker in all
contexts, and the case against Saucier is correspondingly weaker. For present purposes,
however, the author will assume that there is a serious countermajoritarian difficulty in at
least some contexts and will argue that the case for avoidance is nonetheless weak in connection with the order-of-battle problem.
80. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY & SANFORD LEVINSON, THE AMERICAN SUPREME
COURT 108-13 (4th ed. 2004); SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 76, at 134-39.
81. An earlier episode concerned the post-Civil War Congress's fear that the Supreme
Court might overturn its Reconstruction legislation. Congress simply deprived the Court
of jurisdiction to hear a worrisome case, and the Court submitted to its authority. See Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869). These events are discussed at length in
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229
(1973).
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so-called "Court-packing" scheme. 82 The matter never came to a head,
83
Both
as Justice Owen Roberts began to change his vote in key cases.
before and after that episode, legislators unhappy with federal court decisions have proposed legislation to strip the Supreme Court or lower federal courts of jurisdiction over various categories of cases. 84 Were these
efforts to succeed, the result would be fewer of the benefits sought by
way of judicial review. As no modem Justice has suggested either rethinking Marbury or trying to run roughshod over the other branches, the
dilemma remains a source of concern today.
One way to partially escape the dilemma of judicial review is to minimize the number of occasions on which one encounters it, and this is
where the avoidance policy enters the picture.8 5 The last resort rule is a
simple and easily understood tool. Given the value and the potential pitfalls of judicial review, it is hardly surprising that the Court would prefer
to sidestep constitutional questions when it can do so at little or not cost.
It stands to reason that fewer occasions of judicial intervention will produce fewer instances of judicial nullification of legislative and executive
decisions. Fewer nullifications in turn will produce less friction between
the branches. In this way, constitutional avoidance diminishes the worry
that judicial activism may disrupt the balance between majority rule and
constitutional norms. Throughout most of the 1980s, for example, the
Court avoided a definitive ruling on the power of Congress to abrogate
of Constate sovereign immunity, by demanding a "clear statement"
86
gress's intent to do so and relying on the absence of one.
The practice of constitutional avoidance has a long pedigree. From the
beginning, the Court refused to issue advisory opinions 87 and to hand
down rulings that would not bind the executive. 88 Early in the 19th century, Chief Justice John Marshall counseled avoidance of unnecessary
constitutional decisions. 89 In his synthesis of the constitutional avoidance
doctrine, Justice Brandeis gave two examples of the application of the last
82. See MCCLOSKEY & LEVINSON, supra note 80, at 117-18; SULLIVAN & GUNTHER,
supra note 76, at 139-41, 506.
83. See MCCLOSKEY & LEVINSON, supra note 80, at 117.
84. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 22, at 321-22. See also James E. Pfander, Federal
Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionalityof Jurisdiction-StrippingLegislation, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 191, 192-93 (2007) (discussing more recent proposals).
85. See Kelley, supra note 69, at 836 ("Given the dramatic character of judicial review,
the Court has from the beginning taken care to minimize the frequency of that confrontation-that is, the number of occasions on which it undertakes even to decide a constitutional question.").
86. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
87. See Correspondence of the Justices (1793), reprinted in FALLON ET AL., supra note
22, at 78-79.
88. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410 (1792). See FALLON ET AL., supra note
22, at 96-105 (discussing the problem of executive and legislative revision of judicial
decisions).
89. See Ex Parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558). See
also Kloppenberg, supra note 61, at 1004; Schauer, supra note 68, at 73, 73 n.9.
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resort rule. 90 One is the "alternative ground" fact pattern, in which
someone challenges state action on a non-constitutional ground as well as
a constitutional one. 9 1 If his non-constitutional claim is sound, he wins no
matter how the constitutional issue is resolved. 92 The second example
concerns Supreme Court review of a state judgment resting on both state
and federal substantive grounds, such as where someone challenges the
legality of a police search as a violation of both state law and the Fourth
Amendment and wins on both theories in the state court. 9 3 No matter
how the federal ground is resolved, the state court's ruling on state law is
adequate to support the judgment and decision on the federal ground is
unnecessary. 94 Besides Justice Brandeis's examples, constitutional avoidance also provides some of the underpinning of the law of justicibility and
standing. Standing is denied to a federal court litigant who lacks a "distinct and palpable" injury that is caused by the action he challenges or
would not be remedied by the relief he requests, for there is no compelling need for judicial intervention in such a case. 95 Similarly, persons who
raise objections before they suffer harm may be turned away from federal
court for lack of ripeness, 96 and those who persist in seeking to litigate
97
disputes that are no longer alive find their cases dismissed for mootness.
While other factors besides the avoidance policy also help to shape these
doctrines, 9 8 in many cases, a primary rationale for dismissal is that an
90. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-52 (1984) (explaining that these and
other standing questions "must be answered by reference to the Art. III notion that federal
courts may exercise power only in the last resort, and as a necessity") (citation omitted).
96. See, e.g., Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08
(2003).
97. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974).
98. For example, whether a case will be dismissed for mootness may depend on the
reasons why the defendant has ceased the offending conduct. See, e.g., City of Mesquite v.
Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 & n.11 (1982). It may also depend on whether the
case is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25
(1973). Ripeness can turn on whether more facts need to be developed in order to resolve
the issues presented. See, e.g., Nat'l Park HospitalityAss'n, 538 U.S. at 808, 812. Standing
can be present or absent depending on whether the offending action is taken by Congress
or the Executive. Compare Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553,
2555-68 (2007), and Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489-90 (1982) (rejecting taxpayer standing to challenge executive branch transfer of funds on Establishment Clause grounds), with Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) (recognizing taxpayer standing to challenge Congressionalexpenditure on Establishment Clause grounds). On the Constitutional provision relied upon by
the plaintiff, compare Flast, 392 U.S. at 105-06, with DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S.
Ct. 1854, 1865-68 (2006) (rejecting taxpayer standing to challenge state expenditure on
Commerce Clause grounds). For another set of factors bearing on justiciability, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 635-36 (2006) (arguing that "concerns
about remedies exert a nearly ubiquitous, often unrecognized, and little understood influence in the shaping and application of justiciability doctrines").
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unnecessary constitutional decision ought to be avoided. 99
Despite the benefits of constitutional avoidance, it is best characterized
as a flexible norm, not an absolute requirement. 0 0 The objection to unbending adherence to the last resort rule is that the benefits come at a
price and the price will sometimes be too high. To see why, imagine an
(admittedly unrealistic) regime in which the Court took the extreme view
favoring avoidance in all cases. Unbridled avoidance would effectively
abandon judicial review altogether and deny all relief to litigants with
constitutional claims. No one proposes that. In its strongest form, the
policy is that courts should avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions.
The adequate state ground doctrine cited by Justice Brandeis identifies
situations in which nothing the Supreme Court may do with the federal
issue would modify the outcome. 0 1 The "alternate ground" principle applies where the result would be the same whether the federal court de10 2
cides the federal issue or not.
But determining what is "unnecessary" requires the exercise of judgment and the drawing of lines. Even in situations where a ruling on the
constitutional issue is arguably unnecessary, constitutional avoidance produces costs as well as benefits, and the characterization of judicial intervention as "unnecessary" may depend on how much good will be
accomplished by ruling on the matter rather than whether anything of
value will be gained. When the Supreme Court declines to review a state
court holding on a constitutional issue because of an adequate state
ground, it foregoes the opportunity to correct an error of federal law, to
clear up confusion about the content of federal law, and to resolve conflicts among lower courts.10 3 Sometimes these considerations are strong
enough to justify departures from the avoidance policy. In Michigan v.
Long, 0 4n for example, the Court faced the problem of how to deal with
ambiguous state court opinions. The ambiguity issue concerns state court
99. See Healy, supra note 22, at 896-98 (discussing the influence of the avoidance policy in standing, ripeness, and mootness decisions).
100. See Rescue Army v. Mun. Ct., 331 U.S. 549, 574 (1947) ("[T]he policy's applicability can be determined only by an exercise of judgment relative to the particular presentation, though relative also to the policy generally and to the degree in which the specific
factors rendering it applicable are exemplified in the particular case."). Some of the postRescue Army cases illustrating the flexible application of the "last resort rule" are discussed in Kloppenberg, supra note 61. at 1027-36.
It seems fair to call "last resort" a rule, even though its application is spotty. There are
degrees of "ruleness." See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 113-18, 196
(1991) (noting that rules may have exceptions and nonetheless remain rules). So long as
avoidance is a policy with significant weight across a range of cases one can usefully speak
of last resort as a rule, despite the many exceptions to it. In any event, whether it ought to
be called a rule or a policy is irrelevant to this Article.
101. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Bandies, J., concurring) (citing Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 51 (1908)).
102. Id.; Berea Coll., 211 U.S. at 51.
103. See Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, ProceduralCommon Law, Federal
Jurisdictional Policy, and the Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State
Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1384-89 (1986).
104. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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judgments supported by opinions that do not clearly indicate whether
they are based on state or federal grounds. 10 5 In some earlier cases, the
Court, out of fidelity to the avoidance policy, had presumed that such
judgments were based on state grounds, thereby avoiding the constitutional issues they presented. 0 6 Long abandoned that approach, as well
as other ways of dealing with ambiguous state opinions,10 7 in favor of the
opposite presumption, that is, that the state court judgment rests on federal grounds unless it contains a "plain statement" to the contrary. 0 8
The older approach gave too little credit to the "important need for uni09
formity in federal law."'
Similar flexibility applies in the "alternate grounds" cases. When a federal court ignores the constitutional issue in favor of an alternate ground,
it leaves the content of federal law less certain and gives up the opportunity to accord federal law the force it deserves in regulating official conduct. In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, the constitutional
issue was whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment forbids a local government from providing a sign language interpreter for a
deaf student at a religious school."10 Though statutory grounds were
available and were argued to the Supreme Court,"' a 5-4 majority insisted on reaching the constitutional issue. 112 Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained that "only First Amendment questions were pressed on the
Court of Appeals," so that "the prudential rule of avoiding constitutional
questions has no application."' '13 This reasoning may not be wholly persuasive, for the point of avoidance is to serve the Court's institutional
need to minimize friction, and that need has nothing to do with the litigation history of the case. Nonetheless, there were good pragmatic reasons
for declining to apply the avoidance policy in Zobrest. The case provided
the Court with an opportunity "to clarify a highly contentious issue of
105. Id. at 1037-44.
106. See, e.g., Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1934).
107. The other methods adopted in earlier cases were (1) sending the case back to the
state court for clarification and (2) independent inquiry by the Supreme Court into the
ultimate grounds for the ruling. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1038-39.
108. Id. at 1040-41.
109. Id. at 1040. For another example of the Court's willingness to give other factors
priority over adherence to a strong avoidance policy, see U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). There the plaintiff, a federal prisoner, attempted to bring a
class action to challenge regulations affecting the availability of parole. Id. at 390. The
district court denied his request to frame the suit as a class action, and he was released
from prison under the guidelines he had challenged. Id. at 393-94. Even though he no
longer had a live dispute on the merits, the Court rejected mootness, reasoning that the
issue of class certification remained alive. Id. at 397-401. The pragmatic explanation for
the outcome is that other prisoners still may have an ongoing dispute with the government,
the plaintiff's lawyer was still interested in the litigation, and a class may ultimately be
certified. Id. at 402-04. All the same, under a strict reading of the "avoidance" policy, the
Court would surely have reached the opposite result. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 22, at
215-16.
110. 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
111. See Kloppenberg, supra note 61, at 1006-08.
112. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 7-8.
113. Id.
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public importance and no invalidation of legislative or executive action
' 4
[was] required."
III.

THE ORDER-OF-BATLE PROBLEM COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE

The lesson taught by cases like Long and Zobrest is that the decision
whether to apply the last resort rule depends on an assessment of the
costs and benefits of avoidance in a given situation. It is, of course, impossible to assign a numerical value to those pluses and minuses, and
equally impossible to show that the calculation must come out one way
rather than the other as a matter of logic. All the same, one may better
understand the stakes and evaluate the strength of the case for avoidance
by situating the order-of-battle problem within the whole range of cases
where the last resort rule may be applied. This Part of the Article argues
that, by comparison with other areas where avoidance may be justified,
the benefits are low in the order-of-battle context and the costs are high.

A.
1.

Low

BENEFITS

Qualified Immunity and the Merits.

One reason why the benefits are low in the order-of-battle context is
that applying qualified immunity law requires some attention to the substantive constitutional standard. Immunity does not depend on the officer's subjective good faith, but on whether he violated "clearly
established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." 115 In resolving the immunity issue, the court must concentrate on the substantive law at the time of the challenged action. 116
Under Saucier, the immunity issue is resolved only after the court has
concluded that the plaintiff's allegations state a constitutional violation
today. 117 In this way, the Saucier order-of-battle separates the substantive issue from the immunity issue and thereby promotes analytical clarity. Absent Saucier, a court that undertakes to resolve the immunity issue
first may have difficulty distinguishing between the two. In Seigert v. Gilley, the Supreme Court pushed this argument a step further, suggesting
114. Kloppenberg, supra note 61, at 1065. Pullman abstention-in which federal courts
defer consideration of constitutional issues while the parties obtain from the state court a
decision on a possibly dispositive state law issue-is also justified, in part, by the avoidance
policy. See R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941). But the Court also
recognizes that the cost of abstention may be too great to justify the benefits, such as when
the delay in getting a definitive reading of state law will be too great. See, e.g., Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378 (1964) (deciding that the vagueness of state law would require
multiple state court rulings to clear up). Professor Kloppenberg goes further and "rejects
efficiency and fear of friction as legitimate grounds for applying Pullman abstention."
Kloppenberg, supra note 61, at 1056-57.
115. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
116. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) ("If the law at that time did not
clearly establish that the officer's conduct would violate the Constitution, the officer
should not be subject to liability or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation.").
117. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
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that the substantive issue and the immunity issue are inevitably connected: "A necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the
constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff is clearly established at the
time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has
asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all." 1 18
Judge Leval disputes this reasoning, arguing to the contrary that "[i]t is
often immediately apparent that the claimed right was not clearly established at the time of the defendant's conduct, while it may be very difficult to determine whether the claimed right should be found to exist." 119
Judge Leval seems to have the better of this argument. Consider the Supreme Court's disposition of Saucier and Brosseau. In both cases, the
Court managed to address the immunity issue without resolving the substantive one.120 If the Court's reasoning in Seigert overstates the substance-immunity link, it may nonetheless accurately reflect the practical
realities of most constitutional adjudication. In a qualified immunity
case, a court must not only examine the law as it existed at the time of the
challenged act, but also decide what inferences a reasonable officer ought
to draw from it.121 Inevitably, the opinion will contain analysis and judgments about the state of the law, its evolution, and its internal logic.
Given that ordinary statutes of limitations apply to constitutional tort
cases, 22 the time in question will not be very far in the past. In the
course of this analysis it will often be possible to remain agnostic as to the
present law. It seems likely, however, that courts will often draw conclusions about the current constitutional landscape and will in one way or
23
another make their views known.
But suppose the author of the opinion takes care to distinguish between qualified immunity and the merits, such that he successfully keeps
the two issues separate and the ruling on immunity gives no clue as to the
current state of the law. Even so, putting the immunity issue first will
often have little or no impact on avoidance, Adjudication of a constitu118. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
119. Leval, supra note 17, at 1278 n.86.
120. See Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 197.
121. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-41 (2002) (explaining that officers must have
"fair warning"). See also Amanda K. Eaton, Note, Optical Illusions: The Hazy Contours of
Clearly Established Law and the Effects of Hope v. Pelzer on the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 38 GA. L. REV. 661, 690 (2004) (suggesting that Hope implies that "decisions arising
out of entirely distinct factual scenarios can provide clearly established law if the premise
or general reasoning is relevant to the case in question"). For an illustration of this theme,
see Craighead v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954, 962 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he issue [under Hope] is not
whether prior cases present facts substantially similar to the present case but whether prior
cases would have put a reasonable officer on notice that the use of deadly force in these
circumstances would violate [the suspect's] right not to be seized by the use of excessive
force.").
122. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985).
123. Judge Sutton, an influential foe of Saucier, acknowledges this relationship. See
Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 581 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring) ("The
constitutional and non-constitutional questions in a qualified immunity case overlap, and it
often may be difficult to decide whether a right is clearly established without deciding
precisely what the existing constitutional right happens to be."). See also Wilkinson v.
Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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tional tort case presenting both substantive and immunity issues must follow one of three paths: (1) The plaintiff has alleged the violation of a
clearly established constitutional right, in which case the constitutional
issue will not be avoided no matter what the sequence; (2) The plaintiff
fails to show a prima facie violation of a constitutional right, so there is no
friction with the majoritarian branches no matter what the sequence (in
fact, democratic decision making may be better served if the constitutional issue is decided at the outset rather than avoided by way of the
"last resort rule," as the ruling on the merits would dispel concerns about
the scope of legislative and executive power);' 24 (3) the plaintiff's allegations state a violation of a constitutional right, but the right was not
clearly established at the time of the act.
The third path is the only one in which there will be more or less judicial-majoritarian friction, depending on whether the constitutional issue
or the immunity issue is decided first. Under Saucier, the court will rule
on the constitutional issue, contrary to the avoidance policy. Under the
"last resort rule," the court will decide the immunity issue first. In the
course of the opinion it may or may not provide guidance on the substantive issue for future reference. To the extent it does indicate that the
plaintiff's right was in fact vioiated, even in dicta, it will not have fully
avoided the constitutional issue. Only when it examines the substantive
law with sufficient care to show that the right was not clearly established-but not so comprehensively as to indicate the current state of the
law-will it have successfully implemented the avoidance policy. 125
2.

The Type of Litigation in Which Order-of-Battle Problems Arise

Some section 1983 suits give rise to an order-of-battle issue, but many
do not, and the ones that do tend to be cases in which the benefits of
avoidance are low. Constitutional litigation can be divided into two
broad categories. One consists of suits in which the sole defendant is an
official and the sole relief sought is recovery of damages. This is the type
of case in which the order-of-battle is key, because the outcome may turn
on the immunity issue. The other category includes lawsuits seeking relief against an ongoing, threatened, or systemic practice, such as the operation of a school system, a jail, or some other public agency. This second
category includes suits brought against state officials to challenge statutes
and ongoing administrative practices, 12 6 as well as litigation against mu124. See Graebe, supra note 12, at 427 (arguing that by resolving cases on immunity
grounds courts may "needlessly dissuade lawsuit-wary government actors from engaging in
conduct that is legal"); see also id. at 428-29.
125. The foregoing rationale for rejecting constitutional avoidance applies only to qualified immunity. Although the link between the qualified immunity inquiry and the merits
may weaken the avoidance policy, there is no such link between absolute immunity and the
merits. Since absolute immunity depends on the officer's function, its availability can be
determined without considering the merits. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
Other arguments for keeping Saucier apply to both absolute and qualified immunity.

126. State governments are immune from suit on account of the constitutional principle

of sovereign immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Con-
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nicipal governments, who may be held liable for activities the Supreme
Court calls their "official policies" and "customs.' 27 "Customs" are
widespread practices of which high officials know or should know, 28 and
"official policies" include rules of general applicability promulgated by
municipal lawmakers, 2 9 inadequate municipal training programs that
produce constitutional violations, 30 as well as the decisions of a municipality's final policymakers.13 ' When the defendant is a municipal government, the order-of-battle problem does not arise because these
governments have no immunity.' 32 Even if an official is also named as a
defendant, it may be necessary to address the constitutional issue in order
to adjudicate the case against the municipality. Nor is sequencing a consideration when the plaintiff seeks prospective relief, for qualified immu133
nity shields the officer only from liability for damages.
Because of the distinctive features of the type of litigation that presents
the order-of-battle issue, the benefits of avoidance are significantly lower
than they are in other types of constitutional litigation. Constitutional
avoidance aims at minimizing friction between the judicial branch and the
majoritarian ones. But there are degrees of friction between judicial authority and democratic rule, and judicial review produces more of it in
some cases than others. 134 The tension is comparatively high when judges
nullify the acts of politically accountable bodies and officers, such as state
legislatures, municipal governing bodies, and elected executive officials.
The danger of friction is also especially acute when courts interfere with
the core projects pursued by elected officials, which typically consist of
broad policies of general application. Now consider the class of constitugress may abrogate that immunity in certain circumstances, but the Supreme Court has
held that section 1983 does not do so. Id. at 65-66. Accordingly, states may not be sued at
all under section 1983, either in federal or state court. Id. at 66; see also Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1979). Nonetheless, challenges to state action seeking prospective
relief can be maintained against their officers under the principle established in Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). See FALLON ET AL., supra note 22, at 994-97.
127. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 708 (1978).
128. Compare Baron v. Suffolk County Sheriff's Dep't, 402 F.3d 225, 238 (1st Cir. 2005)
(finding a custom of retaliating against police officers who broke the internal "code of
silence" about misconduct by other officers), with Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d
206, 227 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[W]e cannot see in the record admissible evidence from which a
rational factfinder could find that racial harassment of Black corrections officers ... was so
widespread as to permit an inference that the Department had a policy or custom of such
harassment."). Just what state of mind is required of high officials remains an open issue,
but one that is irrelevant to the argument of this Article.
129. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 661, 694-95.
130. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). See also Bd. of County
Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404-05 (1997) (explaining that ill-considered hiring decisions, if sufficiently egregious, may trigger municipal liability).
131. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986); Granda v. City of
St. Louis, 472 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 2007); Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir.
2003).
132. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).
133. See Sup. Ct. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736 (1980).
134. See Friedman, Academic Obsession, supra note 79, at 165-66 (explaining that
"most of the scholarship in which the countermajoritarian difficulty appears rests on an
overly simplified and largely inaccurate understanding of American democracy").
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tional tort cases in which the order-of-battle matters. This class consists
almost entirely of litigation against street-level bureaucrats, such as "police, prison guards, and prosecutors whose accountability hardly equates
with a popular mandate."'1 35 Accordingly, section 1983 cases seeking
damages from officials will typically be located at the "less friction" end
of the spectrum. In these cases there136is comparatively less tension between judicial review and democracy.
The point of distinguishing between the two categories of constitutional
litigation should be evident: Order-of-battle problems come up in suits
seeking damages for the acts of individual, low-level officers, and not in
litigation challenging the decisions of high officials or seeking systemic
relief. This distinction dovetails with the one between situations where
friction is low and those in which it is high. For the most part, the very
presence of an order-of-battle issue is a good indication that the case is
one in which the counter-majoritarian difficulty is comparatively weak
and the benefits of avoidance will be correspondingly small. At the same
time, the costs of avoidance are especially high in the constitutional tort
context.
B.

HIGH COSTS

1. Applying the "Last Resort Rule" Would Thwart the Aims of
Constitutional Tort
Constitutional avoidance is a general policy that cuts across all fields of
constitutional adjudication. Ordinarily the impact of the "last resort
rule" will be ad hoc and haphazard, foreclosing a ruling on this or that
constitutional point because of an adequate state ground, availability of
an alternative non-constitutional rationale, lack of justiciability, or lack of
standing. If it is applied to the order-of-battle problem, however, its impact on constitutional tort law will likely be far more systematic. As the
Court recognized in Saucier, fidelity to the "last resort rule" can easily
stunt the growth of substantive constitutional tort law. 137 Failure to articulate the existence of the right in case # 1 will provide no guidance to
135. Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of JudicialReview: A Constitutional
Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.427, 507 (1997) .
136. For an extended treatment of the point made in this paragraph, see Kreimer, supra
note 135, at 505-07. Kreimer's reasoning also rebuts the application to constitutional tort
of other versions of the general theme of constitutional avoidance. See id. at 506-07. For
example, Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that the Court ought to rule narrowly when
doing so can promote what he calls "democratic deliberation" about important issues of
social policy. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 3-4 (1999). Whatever the merit of Sunstein's thesis, it seems inapposite
to constitutional torts. These cases, where no "official policy" or "custom" is at stake, and
no prospective relief is requested, rarely require courts to make judgments on matters that
reflect the outcome of democratic decision making on social goals and the means for
achieving them.
137. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (explaining that the order-of-battle
rule ensures "the process for the law's elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason
for our insisting upon turning to the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right as
the first inquiry").
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officers and leave the law uncertain when case # 2 comes up, and so on.
To the extent the law does not become more concrete over time, immunity will continue to be available. To the extent cases continue to be resolved by finding immunity, the law will continue to remain less rather
than more concrete. Consider the First Amendment issue raised in
Morse v. Frederick. As Justice Breyer pointed out in his separate opinion, lower courts faced with the task of determining the free speech rights
of public school students have been all over the lot. 138 One Supreme
Court precedent directs them to focus on whether the speech is unduly
disruptive of the learning environment. 13 9 Another seems to broaden the
authority of school administrators in at least some contexts, 40 and a third
sets up an entirely different framework for speech that can be attributed
to the school itself.14' Justice Breyer may well be right that the law bearing on the "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banner was not clearly established, so that
the principal who disciplined Frederick would escape liability for damages no matter how the "difficult"' 42 substantive issue is resolved. 4 3 But
disposing of the case on immunity grounds does nothing to clarify the law
for other students and administrators going forward.
What is more, the costs of uncertainty will not be spread evenly across
plaintiffs and defendants alike, but will systematically disfavor the constitutional claimant. Recall that the friction-reducing benefits of avoidance
are realized only in the case where the plaintiff actually has a good constitutional case, the right is not clearly established, and, in the course of
finding immunity, the court avoids clarifying the substantive constitutional law. 144 Notice that this is also the type of case in which the costs of
avoidance are especially high. Part of the cost is that leaving the state of
the law in flux permits defendants to escape liability for damages for con138. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). See also Samuel P. Jordan, Comment, Viewpoint Restrictions and School-Sponsored Student Speech: Avenues for Heightened Protection, 70 U.

CHI. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2003) ("In attempting to strike... a balance regarding limitations
on viewpoint expression ... lower courts have reached inconsistent results, disagreeing on
which doctrines to apply and how to interpret Supreme Court precedent."); Alexander G.
Tuneski, Note, Online, Not On Grounds: Protecting Student Internet Speech, 89 VA. L.

REV. 139, 149 (2003) ("Faced with a void of guidance from the high court, lower courts
have adopted two contrasting approaches to the treatment of student speech taking place
off-campus.").
139. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (determining that student speech may not be suppressed unless officials reasonably conclude that it
will "materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school").
140. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (finding that school

authorities did not violate the student's first amendment rights when they disciplined him
for "offensively lewd and indecent speech" at a school assembly). See also Morse, 127 S.
Ct. at 2626-27 (pointing out that "[t]he mode of analysis emoloyed in Fraseris not entirely
clear" and going on to describe Fraseras having "established that the mode of analysis set
forth in Tinker is not absolute").
141. Hazlewood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).

142. Morse, 127 S.Ct. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
143. Nor did the Morse majority improve matters much with its narrow rule permitting
administrators to discipline students who "celebrat[e]" the use of illicit drugs. Id. at 2625.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
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stitutional violations for an indefinite period of time, to the detriment of
persons who have suffered constitutional injuries and cannot recover for
them. Besides the harm to victims, leaving constitutional tort issues undecided impedes the public interest in building a coherent and effective
body of constitutional tort law.
The cost of avoidance is concentrated in another way as well. It weighs
most heavily on certain kinds of litigants and certain kinds of constitutional claims. Here the starting point is the discussion in Part II.A.2 regarding the types of constitutional litigation that generate order-of-battle
problems.t 45 Since there is no order-of-battle problem in suits for prospective relief and suits against local governments, the costs of overturning Saucier fall entirely on plaintiffs whose only remedy is damages
against an official. Complaints about the conduct of particular officers
toward this particular plaintiff rarely produce a successful suit against a
local government. 146 Nor do such suits ordinarily support a request for
prospective relief, simply because it is hard to show a likelihood of recurrence of the wrongdoing, and such a showing is crucial. 147 Many constitu149
tional cases involving excessive force 148 or illegal seizures by the police
fit this model, as do suits brought by public employees charging that
145. See supra text accompanying notes 126-36.
146. A local government could be held liable only if the conduct is sufficiently widespread to meet the test for a "custom," or if the plaintiff can show that it resulted from
inadequate training, hiring, or supervision, or if a higher-up final policymaker has ratified
the decision and the unconstitutional reason for it. Under each of these theories the plaintiff faces a high hurdle, in that the government cannot be held liable on a respondeat
superior theory. For inadequate training, supervision, and hiring suits, liability may be
imposed on the local government only by showing that the officials in charge manifested
"deliberate indifference" to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Bd. of County
Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 412-15 (1997); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
388-92 (1989). Though the Supreme Court has not yet told us how much knowledge is
necessary for the other two categories, it seems likely that "deliberate indifference" will
prevail in those contexts as well.
For illustrations of the difficulties plaintiffs have in trying to sue local governments on
this theory, see Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 390 (8th Cir. 2007) ("[O]nly
where a municipality's failure to adopt adequate safeguards was the product of deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants will the municipality be liable for
an unconstitutional policy under § 1983."). See also Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130,
1145 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding no municipal liability in a false arrest case because "[t]he
City of Atlanta undeniably trains its officers not to arrest unless there is probable cause to
support the arrest."); Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484-85 (9th Cir. 2007)
(explaining that, in an excessive force case, "evidence of the failure to train a single officer
is insufficient to establish a municipality's deliberate policy").
147. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 & n.8 (1983). Recent illustrations of this theme include Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 342-43 (6th Cir. 2007) and
Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 214-16 (2nd Cir. 2004). For an illustration of the type of
case in which a request for prospective relief may succeed, see Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 354, 355 n.3 (1983) (deciding that because plaintiff had been arrested for vagrancy fifteen times, he was therefore entitled to seek an injunction against enforcement of
the ordinance against him in the future.).
148. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 1776 (2007); Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
149. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 396 (1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
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higher-ups retaliated against them for protected speech,1 50 suits by persons claiming that some government benefit is "property" of which they
cannot be deprived without due process,' 5' and "class of one" equal protection claims, in which plaintiffs claim that they were singled out for un-

favorable treatment. 15 2 The cost of avoidance rests heavily on these
1 53
plaintiffs and these constitutional claims.
There is, in short, a significant category of substantive constitutional
issues that courts will rarely face unless they put aside the last resort rule
in order-of-battle cases.' 54 Leaving these issues undecided may well be
entirely acceptable to the twenty-eight state attorneys general who joined
an amicus brief in Scott v. Harris 55 favoring reconsideration of the Saucier sequencing rule, for the paramount litigating interest of the defendant in a constitutional tort case is to escape liability. But it thoroughly
undermines the aims of constitutional tort law. Suits seeking damages for
constitutional violations help to vindicate constitutional rights, compensate people for the harm they suffer from constitutional wrongs, and de-

150. See Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First Amendment, and Public Employee
Speech: Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REV. 939, 983-86
(2001). Many First Amendment "retaliation" suits concern challenges to a particular decision made by a particular low-level officer, not a systematic practice or the act of a final
policy maker. See id. at 982 & n.258. In theory, prospective relief is an option in many of
these public employee speech cases, as successful plaintiffs could ask for injunctions requiring their former employers to rehire them, but this is often not a viable remedy in practice
simply because the plaintiff has moved on in life and does not want to return to an unhappy workplace. Id. at 986.
151. See, e.g., Bolton v. City of Dallas, 472 F.3d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 2006); Kirkland v. St.
Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. No. RE-1J, 464 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2006); Harris v. Hays, 452
F.3d 714, 719 (8th Cir. 2006); Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 616 (6th
Cir. 2006); Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F.3d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 2001).
152. The leading case is Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000).
See also Tapalian v. Tusino, 377 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004).
153. Judge Leval and the States' Brief assert that the cost of overruling Saucier is low,
because local government suits, prospective relief suits, and suppression hearings will suffice for the development of substantive constitutional law. See States' Brief, supra note 21,
at *11; Leval, supra note 17, at 1280-81. It is true that there will be substantial overlap
between the range of Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues litigated in suppression
hearings and those that litigants raise in section 1983 suits, but that is a narrow range of
cases. Reliance on local government and prospective relief suits as means to address the
full array of constitutional issues is misplaced because of the differences between the types
of issues typically asserted in those cases and the issues that come up in constitutional tort
suits involving excessive force, retaliatory dismissal, government-benefits-as-property,
"class of one" equal protection, and other claims that typically challenge the decisions of
isolated officials.
154. The States' Brief draws an analogy between section 1983 and habeas corpus, in
which federal courts are presumptively barred from adjudicating claims based on "new
law." See States' Brief, supra note 21, at *11. See also Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct.
1173, 1180-81 (2007); Carey v. Musiadin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); FALLON ET AL., supra
note 22, at 1325 (discussing the "new law" theme in habeas corpus and qualified immunity
doctrine). Since limits on habeas have not "inhibited the development of constitutional
law," the States' Brief reasons, there is no reason to fear that repudiating Saucier would do
so either. States' Brief, supra note 21, at *20. But the analogy is not apt, as criminal procedure issues that are excluded from habeas are litigated routinely in criminal trials and on
direct review. Unlike section 1983 damage suits against officers, there is no distinctive
class of cases in which another forum is rarely available.
155. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 (2007).
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ter constitutional violations. 156 At the same time, a countervailing
concern is that liability will unfairly burden officers who thought they
were acting properly and deter them from taking steps that may expose
them to liability. 157 The Court's solution to this conflict is not to sacrifice
the plaintiff's interest for the sake of providing maximum protection to
officials. It has sought instead to achieve a "balance" between the considerations on either side. 158 For most officers, the risk of overdeterrence
justifies "qualified" immunity, available only so long as they do not violate clearly established law. As the Court explained in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, more comprehensive immunity would interfere too much with the
deterrent and vindication goals served by constitutional torts. 159
Application of the "last resort rule," by effectively insulating some official conduct from constitutional oversight, frustrates this effort to accommodate competing values. Putting the immunity issue first has the effect
of systematically restricting the opportunities for developing substantive
constitutional law on topics that typically arise in suits for damages.
However strong the theoretical merits of the friction-reducing rationale
for the last resort rule, the real-world result will be that the defendant's
litigation interest triumphs. As courts articulate fewer and fewer substantive constitutional rules, officers' immunity from damages will inevitably
prevail over the public interest in deterring constitutional violations as
well as the plaintiff's interest in vindicating his rights, contrary to the balance struck by the Court in Harlow.
Harlow rests on the premise that immunity for executive acts should be
qualified rather than absolute. 160 That premise, in turn, reflects a judgment that uncertainty about the content of constitutional law is indeed a
problem, and that the short to intermediate term solution to the problem
is to shield officers by means of qualified immunity. Immunity is a tool
for coping with the uncertainty problem, not a good in itself. The vindication and deterrent aims of constitutional tort law can only be met over
the long term by minimizing the role of immunity in constitutional tort
cases. This goal can only be achieved if courts constantly "elaborate the
constitutional right with greater degrees of specificity"' 161 so that there
156. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139-42 (1988); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 814 (1982); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267-68 (1981);
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-54 (1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
253-57 (1978). An attempt to synthesize these cases and others into a general account of
the aims of constitutional tort liability may be found in Michael Wells, ConstitutionalRemedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 Miss. L.

157, 190-92 (1998).

157. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
158. Id. at 807 ("[R]ecognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives reflect[s] an attempt to balance competing values."). See also id. at 814.
159. See id. at 807-09, 813-14. The Court explained that "an action for damages may
offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees. It is this recognition that has required the denial of absolute immunity to most public officers." Id. at 814
(citations omitted). For a scholarly defense of the Court's "fault-based" regime, see John
C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47,
68-81 (1998).
160. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
161. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001).
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will be fewer and fewer occasions for invocation of immunity. 16 2 There
may well be topics on which the Court should make less constitutional
law rather than more, because the issues are politically sensitive or because broad judicial intervention would interfere too much with democratic decision making. 163 But in the constitutional tort field we should
maximize the occasions for elaborating the content of constitutional law
rather than looking for ways to minimize them.
The point here is not that obliging courts to decide more rather than
fewer constitutional issues will result in a proliferation of newly-minted
constitutional rights. On the contrary, the contemporary federal judiciary
often finds against the claimed constitutional right rather than for it.164
Partisans of seeing to it that state officers are made accountable for their
violations may prefer a regime in which rights remain undefined over one
in which courts rule against the plaintiff's substantive argument on the
165
merits.
In the author's view, this view is short-sighted. For one thing, if it is
true that the current crop of federal judges are not especially sympathetic
to expansive interpretations of the Bill of Rights, it is also true that the
political composition of the federal judiciary changes over time. 166 The
partisan of expansive readings of constitutional rights, who prefers the
avoidance doctrine today may find himself in an embarrassing position
when a new President names a raft of new judges. A more prudent
course is to base the order-of-battle doctrine on factors that go beyond
present political circumstances and stick to the rule as the criteria for
selecting judges change over time. Otherwise the choice is vulnerable to
the charge that it is solely a matter of politics.
Second, the current federal judiciary has not shown itself to be especially hostile to the garden-variety constitutional claims that comprise
most section 1983 litigation. The twenty-eight state attorneys general
who joined the amicus brief in Scott seeking to have Saucier overturned
probably reckoned that their litigating interests were better served by a
regime in which courts addressed fewer rather than more constitutional
162. See Graebe, supra note 12, at 429-30 (showing that "the merits bypass allows for
the possibility that government actors can repeatedly engage in unconstitutional conduct
previously challenged in court without ever being subject to liability for their actions")
(emphasis added).
163. See supra note 136 (discussing Professor Sunstein's thesis).
164. See Healy, supra note 22, at 930 (reporting that, in circuit court cases decided in
the two years after Saucier, "of ninety-two asserted rights that were not clearly established,
the courts held that seventy were not protected by the Constitution at all").
165. For an argument along these lines, see Healy, supra note 22, at 928-35.
166. See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION
FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 4 , 7-9, 17-20, 30-38, 163-73, 296-307 (1997). Jefferson Powell underlines the importance of this avenue for constitutional change, arguing
that "our history legitimates efforts to persuade the courts to change their views on constitutional matters ... by appointing, as opportunity arises, judges likely to take a different
position." H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION
IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 208 (2002).
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issues. 167 Showing that most rulings on the constitutional merits go
against the plaintiff may indicate only that their lawyers advance ambitious theories of recovery, knowing that most of them will fail. A subtle
virtue of the official immunity doctrine is that it permits courts to recognize novel constitutional theories without imposing undue costs on the
officers found to have crossed a newly-identified constitutional line. In
this way, "the right-remedy gap in constitutional torts facilitates constitutional change by reducing the costs of innovation. '168 These benefits can
only be obtained if the constitutional issue is decided before immunity, as
t 69
Saucier requires.
Even when a court rules against a constitutional claim, its reasoning
may lay the foundation for other, differently framed constitutional arguments. For example, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services rejected a broad affirmative duty on the part of government
70
officers toward vulnerable children with whom they have contact.1 In
doing so, the Court distinguished other situations where a duty may be
found, giving credence to theories of recovery that barely existed before
that case and that have at least sometimes proved successful in its aftermath. 171 The DeShaney court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
county violated the due process rights of a small child by leaving him in
his father's care despite indications that the father abused the boy:
While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it
do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them. That the
State once took temporary custody of Joshua does not alter the analysis, for when it returned him to his father's custody, it placed him in
than that in which he would have been had it not
no worse position
172
acted at all.
This explanation for rejecting the plaintiff's theory of recovery provided the grounds on which lawyers and lower courts could construct
more solid constitutional arguments that "state-created danger" can generate a constitutional violation if the state does bear sufficient responsibility for producing the danger, knows enough about it, and can do
something to diminish it but fails to act. 173 In Breen v. Texas A&M University, for example, the complaint alleged that officials had authorized
167. See State's Brief, supra note 21.
168. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J.

87, 90 (1999).
169. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
170. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989); see
also Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort:
DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REV. 107, 111-15 (1991).
171.

For some illustrations, see SHELDON NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

211-24 (2d ed. 2004).
172. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
173. See, e.g., Breen v. Tex. A&M Univ., 485 F.3d 325, 333 (5th Cir. 2007); Ye v. United
States, 484 F.3d 634, 637-41 (3d Cir. 2007). See also Eaton & Wells, supra note 170, at
149-58 (discussing various "state-created danger" fact patterns).
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students to build a dangerous bonfire on the campus, the bonfire collapsed, and a dozen students were killed.1 74 The 5th Circuit ruled that
these facts would make out a constitutional violation under the state-created danger theory. 75 Had the affirmative duty issue remained undefined, the guidance needed to develop this theory of recovery would not
have existed.
2.

Flexibility Costs More Than It Is Worth

To be fair, opponents of Saucier do not necessarily want to stunt the
growth of substantive constitutional law. In particular, Justice Breyer
does not advocate replacing Saucier's rule with a general rule of constitutional avoidance on the order-of-battle issue. 176 He favors allowing lower
courts discretion to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to adjudicate
the substantive issue first. 177 Three factors support the case for flexibility:
(1) There may well be a hard constitutional issue and, not coincidentally,
an easy immunity issue on account of the difficulty of the constitutional
issue; (2) If the circumstances are such that the substantive outcome matters more to the plaintiff than actually winning damages, the plaintiff may
not appeal a case in which he succeeds on the substantive issue but loses
on immunity, and there will be no way to correct an error on the substantive point; 78 (3) If the circumstances are such that the defendant has a
strong case on immunity, he may focus his efforts on that issue, such that
the substantive issue is poorly presented to the court for lack of effective
179
advocacy.

174. Breen, 485 F.3d at 331.
175. Id. at 337-38 (concluding that "plaintiffs successfully alleged facts showing the vio-

lation of constitutional rights under the state-created danger theory"). The court went on
to rule that the officials were nonetheless entitled to immunity from liability for damages,
because "the state-created danger theory was not clearly established law in the Fifth Circuit" at the time of the incident. Id. at 340.
176. Scott v. Harns, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring). Neither do
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2617 n.10 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying note
22. Pre-Saucier,some lower courts engaged in such careful sifting of the circumstances of
particular cases. See, e.g., Tellier v. Fields, 230 F.3d 502, 510-11 (2nd Cir. 2000). Judge
Leval adds that under a flexible approach, the court may, if the circumstances call for it,
comment in a tentative or preliminary way on the substantive issue, making the issue easier
to resolve the next time around. Leval, supra note 17, at 1281 ("If the conduct is egregious,
or has already escaped review and is probably unconstitutional, the court would warn of
the probable unconstitutionality-without taking a definitive position."). It seems that
Judge Leval wants to have his cake and eat it, too: If comments about the substantive issue
turn out to have weight in later cases, the court has not avoided the constitutional issue at
all.
178. See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 202 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring);
Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1019-21 (2004) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari); States' Brief, supra note 21, at *8; Leval, supra note 17, at 1279.
179. See, e.g., States' Brief, supra note 21, at *9; Leval, supra note 17, at 1277-78.
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Hard Constitutional Issues Coupled with Easy Immunity Issues

Both Morse v. Frederick and Brosseau v. Haugen may fall into this category. In such cases, much time and effort could have been saved by
simply ruling on immunity to start with. Each case would come out the
same as if the court had addressed the constitutional issue first, and the
value of minimizing the counter-majoritarian difficulty would have been
served as well. However attractive flexibility may seem in the abstract, in
the real world it also carries a cost. The main aim of Saucier is to encourage the elaboration of constitutional law. Abandoning Saucier may
effectively sacrifice the elaboration goal. The danger is that district
judges may exercise their discretion in a way that does not give the
proper weight to that aim, by putting their own interest in clearing their
dockets as efficiently as possible ahead of the Court's policy of elaborating constitutional norms.1 80 Both the pre-Saucier reluctance of some
lower court judges to put the substantive issue first' 81 and the hostility
some lower court judges have shown toward Sauciert82 indicate that the
temptation is real. We are accustomed to the notion that delay in resolv183
ing constitutional questions is tolerable, and perhaps even desirable.
Some hard constitutional questions can safely be put off, perhaps indefinitely, because no one incurs a sufficiently distinct and palpable injury
due to the purported violation.' 84 But here again, constitutional tort is a
distinctive field. These plaintiffs claim that they have already suffered an
injury and almost always believe they can prove substantial damages. In
order to vindicate their rights, deter violations, and provide guidance to
officers going forward, the hard constitutional issues need to be decided
sooner rather than later.
Perhaps Justice Breyer's premise is that, as a practical matter, a given
issue may not need resolution unless it comes up repeatedly. 85 In that
event, a lower court following the flexible approach would eventually
choose to reach the substantive issue rather than dismiss on qualified im180. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 539-42 (1988) (arguing that
"what most arguments for ruleness share is a focus on disabling certain classes of decisionmakers from making certain kinds of decisions").
181. See Graebe, supra note 12, at 410 & n.35 (providing authority for the assertion that
"the cases are legion where courts, in their decision-making discretion, have bypassed
pleaded constitutional claims of first impression by assuming arguendo that the claims are
viable and then dismissing them on qualified immunity grounds").
182. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
183. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 41-42 (1961) (arguing that there would be fewer occasions
for sharp disagreement among the Justices "if certain techniques of the mediating middle
way were more imaginatively utilized"). Bickel went on to discuss a number of doctrines,
including standing, ripeness, and the political question doctrine, for dodging especially
thorny constitutional questions. Id. at 42-47.
184. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (rejecting the notion that
standing should be granted to this plaintiff because otherwise no one will have a sufficient
injury for standing).
185. See Leval, supra note 17, at 1280-81 ("At the very least, this risky, unreliable declaration of constitutional rights in dictum should be reserved for the class of cases where a
pattern of repetition, escaping review, is likely.").
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munity grounds. But any given district judge and any given Circuit Court
panel will encounter constitutional tort cases episodically and in a haphazard way. As a result, they may have difficulty discerning patterns.
Given these realities of adjudication, it is hard to be confident that lower
courts will be able to identify recurring problems and address them with
alacrity. Faced with an easy path and a hard one, human beings tend to
take the easy one, and judges are, after all, human. At the very least,
Saucier should have the status of a strong presumption that may be overcome only in exceptional circumstances. Otherwise, the real-world result
may be closer to a rule of "immunity first," thereby thwarting the aims of
constitutional tort law.
b. No Appellate Review of the Substantive Holding
In order to evaluate the insulation-from-review argument, it is useful to
distinguish circuit court review of district court rulings from Supreme
Court review of circuit court rulings. With regard to the first appellate
stage, it does not make much difference what the district court decided on
the substantive issue, as a district court ruling has no precedential effect
and will not count for much, if it counts at all, in determining what is
"clearly established law" going forward. 186 As for insulation from Supreme Court review, Justice Scalia has proposed that the "general rule
[denying review to the winner below] should not apply where a favorable
judgment on qualified immunity grounds would deprive a party of an opportunity to appeal the unfavorable (and often more significant) constitutional determination."'1 87 Justice Scalia's reasoning in support of this
view shows sensitivity to the aims of constitutional tort and the appropriate balance between those aims and official immunity.18 8 He explains
that the "constitutional determination is not mere dictum in the ordinary
sense, since the whole reason we require it to be set forth.., is to clarify
the law and thus make unavailable repeated claims of qualified immunity
in future cases." 189
c.

Lack of Effective Advocacy on the Substantive Issue

The concern that litigants may not pay sufficient attention to the substantive issue should not be ignored, yet it may underestimate the degree
of uncertainty that envelops most litigation. Plaintiffs and their attorneys
will rarely devote resources to bringing suits that are certain to fail. Defendants will rarely be so confident of success on the immunity issue that
they can simply ignore the substantive one. It is noteworthy that none of
the Supreme Court Justices who disapprove of Saucier have given much
186. While the circuits are divided as to whether district court rulings count at all in
determining the content of clearly established law, none of them give them much weight in
any event. See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 321 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2001).
187. Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1023 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
188. See supra Part III.B.1.

189. Bunting, 541 U.S. at 1023-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiori).
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weight to the risk that litigants will pull their punches, though that danger
is prominently featured in the States' Brief.' 90 In any event, the issue is
not whether this concern deserves to be taken into account. It is whether
the minus of potentially weak advocacy in some cases should overcome
the affirmative case
for the Saucier order-of-battle. If these cases are
"relatively rare,"' 9 ' the balance may tip in favor of strict adherence to
Saucier, or at least to a strong presumption that it be followed absent
compelling reasons to doubt the quality of the advocacy. By contrast,
Justice Breyer and other foes of Saucier seek to replace it with a regime
of broad discretion on the part of district judges to do as they please on a
case by case basis.
IV. CONCLUSION
Saucier's order-of-battle rule-requiring courts to resolve the substantive constitutional issue before the immunity question-may seem to be
highly vulnerable to objections based on constitutional avoidance, as it
flatly rejects the avoidance norm in favor of more rather than fewer rulings on constitutional issues. This Article's aim has been to examine and
reject the constitutional avoidance attack on Saucier. In brief, the
strength of the avoidance policy depends on an assessment of its costs and
benefits in a given context. In the constitutional tort context, the benefits
are slight, because the court must reach some tentative conclusions about
the substantive law in resolving the immunity issue and because these
cases concern oversight of street-level officials rather than nullification of
statutes and broad policies. The costs are high, because deciding immunity issues first stunts the growth of substantive law to the detriment of
the vindication and deterrent goals of constitutional tort law.
What is ultimately at stake in the order-of-battle controversy is
whether the body of constitutional law giving rise to suits for damages
will be a larger and more concrete or a smaller and more imprecise body
of law. No doubt some types of constitutional questions are best left unresolved as long as possible-especially those touching on fundamental
allocations of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches, or between the states and the national government. Constitutional tort law is of a different order. It concerns judicial oversight of the
daily work of police officers, prison guards, school teachers and principals, zoning officials, and others who deal with the public on a daily basis.
It is better that the law bearing on their conduct be as fully developed as
possible, both for the sake of giving them the guidance they need and in
order that victims of their misconduct will have access to an effective
damages remedy.

190. See States' Brief, supra note 21.
191. As suggested in Graebe, supra note 12, at 435.
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